This note is on cautious cut elimination for one of Veltman's might logics. Syntactically, the logic is presented as an extension of a sequent system for classical propositional logic (hence: cpl). I show that this extension preserves the completeness and decidability of cpl. The proof has cautious cut elimination as a corollary. I also give a rather general syntactic proof of cautious cut elimination. It states that anỳ base' logic which has a re exive, monotone consequence relation that allows cautious cut to be eliminated preserves cautious cut elimination when extended to a might logic.
Introduction
The last decade has shown a growing concern with aspects of language interpretation which do not t nicely within the truth conditional paradigm. This led to the idea that the focus should be on the context change potential of a sentence rather than on its truth conditions. Well-known systems that embody this philosophy are the semantics for anaphora, and the dynamic logics for studying computer programs. In this article I investigate a logic for the phrase`it might be', which developed within this tradition. It is This paper is inspired by a talk of Frank Veltman on completeness theorems for might logics. The sections 2{4 elaborate on his notes, now published as Groeneveld and Veltman 1994 (section 3) . I would like to thank him, Tim Fernando, and Willem Groeneveld for discussions. An earlier version of the paper was read at the workshop on Proof Theory and Natural Language (SOAS, London) organized by Ruth Kempson. The remarks from the audience were helpful. This work is part of the PIONIER project`Reasoning with Uncertainty' (NWO grant pgs{22{262).
introduced by Veltman (1991) as a rst step towards more complex systems to handle defaults.
Besides more formal concerns, Veltman tries to explain why (1a) is an acceptable continuation of (1) while (1b) is not.
Somebody is knocking at the door: : : a. It might be John: : : It is Mary. b. It is Mary: : : It might be John.
(1)
The example shows that the acceptability of sentences with`might' depends on the place at which they occur within a text. 1 There are di erent ways in which the phenomenon can be analyzed, but the logic designed by Veltman does so by:
interpreting sentences as update functions over a set of information states; introducing a notion of logical consequence which is sensitive to the order of the premisses. As a result of this set up`might' can be seen as a kind of metalogical devise: it tests whether the formula within its scope can be consistently added to the preceding discourse. If so the information carried by that discourse is preserved unaltered, but otherwise the`might' sentence yields the discourse inconsistent.
Formally, the structure sensitivity of a consequence relation can be mirrored by a sequent system which uses, e.g.,`cautious' versions of cut and monotony. Groeneveld and Veltman 1994 introduce such sequent systems for several might logics, and show them to be sound and complete with respect to what I call concrete models. Their proofs use cautious cut, so the question arises whether this rule can be eliminated. In this article I concentrate on the Update-Test might logic, and give a semantic as well as a syntactic proof of cautious cut elimination. To this end I introduce a new sequent system, which basically adds two rules for the might operator to a sequent system for cpl. The semantic proof of cautious cut elimination is obtained as a corollary to a completeness proof for the system relative to abstract models for the might logic. Syntactically the result follows from the fact that any`base' logic that has a re exive, monotone consequence 1 Tense is another important factor: in case of`it might have been' (1b) is acceptable while (1a) is not. relation and which allows cautious cut to be eliminated preserves cautious cut elimination when extended to a might logic.
Some of the results presented here are also proved by Van Eijck and De Vries (1992) by means of a Hoare logic, and a translation into S5.
Syntax and Semantics
In this section I de ne the syntax and semantics of M, a propositional logic with formulas of the form`M'' corresponding to`it might be the case that ''. The semantics of M is much like that of the Update-Test might logic in Groeneveld and Veltman 1994 . But the notion of model used is more general.
Syntax
The syntax of M is de ned on top of a standard propositional language over a set of propositional letters P := fp 1 ; : : : ; p n ; : : :g . It discerns L 0 and L 1 formulas in order to preclude iterations of the might-operator.
De nition 2.1 (syntax) L 0 F 0 ::
Semantically`might' is interpreted as an operator which tests for consistency, a metaproperty. So the fact that M only occurs as an outermost operator corresponds to a strict division between the object language L 0 and the metalanguage L 1 . Below, formulas of the form M' are called M-formulas.
Semantics
The semantics of M speci es the update function associated with a formula, not its truth conditions. More precisely, a formula ' denotes a function from information states to information states. We therefore have to stipulate, among other things, which information structures will be used. Some natural questions concerning the consequence relation are: What are its structural properties? And how does it relate to classical consequence? That the present relation is sensitive to the order of the premisses is already shown by (2{3) indicating that permutation no longer holds. But it lacks an unconditional form of monotonicity too. For instance, due to idempotency p j = p is true in each model. But not so for p; M:p j = p. Therefore, leftmonotonicity fails for the sequential variants. Right-monotonicity, on the other hand, is valid for j =. Cf. Veltman 1991, Groeneveld and Veltman 1994 . Before proving M to be sound, complete and decidable, I discuss some basic facts of the system.
Basic Facts
Perhaps the most prominent feature of de nition 2.2 is that all formulas are interpreted as operators on a BA. This move to a higher level enables a uniform de nition of interpretation. But L 0 formulas could also be interpreted as elements of a BA, as they normally are. Proposition 2.4, adapted from Veltman 1991, shows that the value of '] at an information state, ' in L 0 , can be de ned in terms of the element > '] (cf. also Van Benthem 1989 
We nish this section with a comparison of the models introduced here with the concrete models de ned by Veltman (1991).
Concrete Models
Veltman considers concrete models, which are based on the following assumptions: a world is a nite set of proposition letters (the atomic facts that hold true in it Concrete models have the great advantage of turning an L 0 -semantics into one for L 1 -sentences. Since a world in an information state is equivalent to an valuation m : P ?! f0; 1g, the concrete models are built by taking the power of the set of models for cpl. Given the L 0 -models, a concrete model contains all possible information states which can be obtained from them. By contrast, de nition 2.2 allows models of this kind to consists of a eld over a subset of the set of all L 0 -models. 4 
2
In case i '] = i, i accepts ' (Veltman 1991, 1) . Proposition 2.7 (iii) shows that acceptance generalizes truth: i accepts ' i ' is valid in i. In a sense, this is dual to i 6 = ? accepting M'. For this is so i there is an m 2 i which makes ' true.
As a simple application of proposition 2.7, we describe the di erence between (1a,b). Consider p =`somebody is knocking on the door', q =`it is John', and r =`it is Mary'. Since both p and q, and p and r are consistent On the other hand, r is inconsistent with the sequence p; q. Therefore:
A eld is a non-empty set of sets which is closed under intersection and complementation.
for each i. (Of course, the argument assumes p to be about just one person.)
The above facts prove useful in establishing completeness and decidability for M, which is the topic of section 4. But rst I give the sequent system M.
3 The System M System M combines a sequent system for the object-language L 0 with one for the meta-language L 1 . 5 With a view to natural language semantics it seems less than ideal to distinguish between levels of language. But logically it is pro cient. For example, the completeness and decidability results below directly extend well-known facts concerning classical logic.
Observe that in the context of the classical structural rules cautious cut, referred to as`ccut', is equivalent to the familiar cut rule. Corollary 4.5 (decidability) The logic M is decidable. Proof In order to check whether or not ` it su ces to search the nitely many states of prop( ; ). As soon as a countermodel is found we know 6 , but otherwise: ` . 2
Corollary 4.6 (ccut elimination)
The cautious cut rule can be eliminated from M. 2
Proof If at all, cautious cut is only used in the classical part, where it is eliminable. 2 I have been careful in presenting M as an extension of classical propositional logic, and the same can be done for the other might logics in Groeneveld and Veltman 1994 . But to what extent does this approach generalize to other base' logics? That is, could we frame the above result as a preservation result of the form: for each complete L 0 -logic of a certain kind, there is a might logic which is complete as well (and similarly for other properties). The main point seems to be to nd a generalization of the concrete models. I leave this question open. A similar question can be asked with respect to cautious cut elimination. But here we need not bother about semantical issues since the result can be proved syntactically. The next section has such a preservation result.
Cautious Cut Elimination
In this section we forget about set-theoretic interpretations and con ne ourselves to syntactic methods. In particular we shall prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 Let`0 be a consequence relation for L 0 -sequents which is re exive, and closed under monotony and cautious cut. Extend the language to an L 1 -language as in de nition 2.1, and extend`0 to`1 for the L 1 -language by closure under the rules M, L m , and cautious cut. If`0 has cautious cut elimination, then so has`1.
Note that we need not assume re exivity for L 1 -sequents, since it can be derived by means of M. This is handy, for it means that in the ccut-free variant of M re exivity need not be considered as`might' introducing.
Proof of theorem 5.1 As in case of`m the relation`0 will contain logical and structural rules for L 0 -sequents. But the use of these rules is blocked after an application of M or L m . This means that if ccut is applied to ccutfree premisses that part of a derivation will have the following structure:
; '`0 ( in ?; ) ; M'; ?` Again, these ccuts are eliminable by assumption.
Case III: M is used once in deriving the left-hand side premiss of the ccut. This case is trivial, for in the right premiss the ccut formula comes from L m .
Case IV: The derivations of both premisses contain an application of M. Again the trivial reduction of the previous case may apply, but the situation may also be more interesting: (', 00 0 , or may be empty). By assumption`0 is decidable, so the recipe de nes a nite search space with all possible initial sequents to introduce the M-formulas in ; . Therefore, `1 i the algorithm nds a derivable L 0 -sequent from which `1 can be derived. In particular, since`c pl is decidable this argument gives a syntactic proof of corollary 4.5.
Further Issues
In this section I name two topics for further study. Firstly, one would like to obtain similar results for formulas with nested occurrences of the mightoperator (cf. Van Eijck and De Vries 1992) . As in Veltman 1991 such nestings are not allowed here, since the re exivity axiom would then be lost. E.g., the formula Mp^:p is not re exive. One way to go would be to assume that re exivity only holds for proposition letters, and to argue that the formulas which do not preserve this property are somehow inadmissible. For instance, the example given corresponds to the unacceptable sentence: it might be p and it isn't p. Secondly, one may wonder about the minimal algebraic structure for the L 0 -part. For instance, do we retain completeness and decidability if we generalize the structures to those of the form hI;^; ?i with^associative and idempotent, and ? a left and right neutral element? Kanazawa 1994b has some results in this direction for a partial version of might'.
